ABSTRACT: We test the effect of changing the experimenter's gender in the trust game. Our assumption is that experimental subjects seek to discover the true purpose of the experiment. Thus, the gender of experimenter may produce a bias to confirm experimenter's expectations in a test on the gender effect. We find that the presence of a female experimenter influences positively trust and reciprocity. This result supports the hypothesis that women are perceived as less selfish than men.
Introduction
The finding that people care about other utilities or payoffs is very common in experimental economics.
1 Despite the self-seeking behaviour assumption of mainstream economics, there is also a long history of formal models trying to theoretically explain why individuals sacrifice to increase utilities or payoffs of others. 2 The gender variable has taken into account to predict altruistic behaviour in social environments. According to the conventional view, women would be more socially-oriented than men. (Eckel and Grossman 1998) This difference would justify the introduction of gender differences in economic models. Recent laboratory work supports this view. There is evidence that men and women exhibit different propensities to trust and to reciprocate. This finding can be attributed to the fact that women have more other-regarding preferences than men. (Innocenti and Pazienza 2006) This result is strictly related to the theory that non-selfish behaviour can be based on the assessment of how altruistic others are in return (Rabin 1993 , Levine 1998 . In this light, gender may signal how altruistic other players may be. However, the hypothesis that women may be perceived by others as potentially less selfish than men is difficult to test in the laboratory, because subjects' expectations are usually investigated by means of questionnaires. In this paper we follow a different approach to study this issue in an actual experiment. We check if the presence in the laboratory of a male or a female experimenter affects individual behaviour. According to the concept of experimenter bias, experimental data can be influenced by the supposed expectations of the person collecting the data. Our test intends to provide evidence of how gender differences in altruism are perceived by experimental subjects.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the object of our experiment and the background literature. The experimental design is illustrated in section three and results are presented and discussed in section four. In section five we draw some conclusions.
1 Ledyard (1995) and Schram (2000) survey experimental evidence of subjects deviating from own-payoff-maximizing behaviour. 2 See Fehr and Schmidt (1995) for a survey.
Experimental purpose
Our experiment tests the trust game, also known as the investment game. This game is played by two players, who are paired off anonymously and respectively named as the sender and the responder. The sender is given a certain amount of money and told that he or she can keep the entire amount or send some or all of it to the responder. Any money passed from the sender to the responder is tripled by the experimenter and then
given to the responder. The responder can keep the entire amount or give back some or all of it to the sender. When the sender receives the amount sent back by the responder the game ends.
This game-theoretical framework offers a simple measure of the propensity to trust, which is the proportion of the initial endowment sent by the sender, and to reciprocate, which is the ratio between the amount returned and the amount received by the responder. The backward induction solution of the trust game predicts that the responder will not send any money back. Anticipating the responder's decision, the sender will not send any money to the responder.
Results from earlier experiments are inconsistent with the conventional game theory prediction. Table 1 offers a summary of some previous results on the trust game. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) subjects were given a summary of the no history treatment results as part of the instructions. Buchan, Croson and Johnson's (2000) international experiment tested the trust game in China, Japan, Korea and United States. Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen (2003) compared three treatments: the first (single role) in which subjects played either sender or responder role, the second (both roles, no prior) in which subjects played both roles but they did not know it before sending, and the third (both roles, prior) where subjects knew that they played both roles before any decisions were made.
Even if there are significant variations across tests, the rational prediction is refuted.
3
Other studies examine gender differences in the trust game. Men generally exhibit greater levels of trust and lower levels of reciprocity than women do, even if the difference between genders is not always statistically significant.
A possible explanation of these results can be given in terms of altruism. It can be argued that trust and trustworthiness depend on different factors. Trust is usually perceived as an economic investment in the trustee's reliability and consequently as a decision dependent on risk attitude or on the perception of the vulnerability to the action of others. Trustworthiness seems to be better explained by institutional, psychological or moral factors, as social distance or inequality aversion, and it is justified by ethical values. However, it is quite evident that both trust and reciprocity may be the result of altruistic preferences. If utility increases in other individuals' utility or consumption the truster can find rational to trust even if he does not expect the trustee to be trustworthy.
Similarly, the trustee may exhibit reciprocity without any economic incentive to reciprocate.
To detect the effect of altruism, Cox (2002) and (2004) propose an experiment that discriminates between transfers resulting from trust or trustworthiness and transfers resulting from altruistic preferences. Cox's findings show that subjects are also moved by altruistic preferences. His conclusion is that utility should not be assumed 3 Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) , Cox (2001) and Cox, Sadiraj and Sadiraj (2002) obtain analogous results by testing the moonlighting game. In the moonlighting game, the sender can choose if she wants to give to the responder part of her endowment or take up to half the endowment given to the responder. The responder can decide whether she wants to give or take money from the sender.
independent of other individuals' payoffs and altruistic preferences should be included in the rational model of economic behaviour.
We replicate Cox's experiment by highlighting gender differences and modifying the information given to the subjects (Innocenti and Pazienza 2006) . Our test
shows that women exhibit a higher degree of altruism than men both for trust and reciprocity but the difference between genders in the degree of altruism is greater for trustworthiness than for trust. Our results support the hypothesis that women's higher propensity to reciprocate than men is motivated by a higher degree of altruism.
These experiments test trust and reciprocity in a double blind laboratory environment, where each participant is guaranteed that neither the experimenter nor the other participants are unable to attribute individual choices to individual subjects. This condition is imposed to minimize the effect of experimenter bias, 4 according to which experimenter's acts can unconsciously convey to subjects how they should behave in relation to some characteristics of the design and consequently produce biased results.
Another case is participant bias, also known as demand characteristics, which applies to experiments in which participants act in ways they believe correspond to what the experimenter is looking for. Thus, if participants modify their spontaneous behaviour to match the real or the presumed aims of the experimenter, results are also biased. These sources of bias are differentiated by the fact that the former is explicitly related to some specific act or characteristic of the experimenter, while the latter refers generically to the experimental design, but it is not always easy to discriminate between them.
What matters more is that in both cases some features of the laboratory environment may induce subjects to change their choices in order to comply with the experiment's purpose. Once the experimenter becomes aware of this effect, data interpretation has to be revised in order to assess the laboratory findings correctly.
The very robust experimental result that subjects prefer fair to maximized payoffs has been also attributed to the influence of experimenter's observation. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) and Bolton and Zwick (1995) name this effect the anonymity hypothesis and give two reasons for it. The first is related to subjects' participation in future experiments. If the experimenter's presumed aim is to provide evidence against self-seeking behaviour, a subject's preference for fair payoffs could increase his or her probability of being recruited again by the same experimenter.
The second reason is ethical: subjects could be concerned with the experimenter's judgement and believe that he or she does or does not disapprove of maximized choices.
Both arguments can be criticized. Experimenters usually prefer inexperienced to experienced subjects, in order to gain a better control over learning processes. The beliefs of experimenters about economic or moral principles are not easily predictable by the participants in experiments.
Orne (1962) offers another possible explanation: "The subject's performance in an experiment might almost be conceptualized as problem-solving behavior; that is, at some level he sees it as his task to ascertain the true purpose of the experiment and respond in a manner which will support the hypotheses being tested. Viewed in this light, the totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject become significant determinants of subjects' behavior." (Orne 1962, p. 778 Observable characteristics of the experimenter, if any, may be among these cues.
Indeed the experimental purpose can also be inferred from his or her gender. For instance, if the design informs subjects of their counterparts' gender the presence of a female experimenter may cause them to believe that the experiment is related in some way to discrimination against women.
Although experimental research is increasingly focused on the gender issue, we are not aware of laboratory tests that try to analyse the effect of experimenter bias across gender differences. 5 Our experiment intends to provide evidence on this issue by Bolton and Zwick (1995) try to find evidence for the hypothesis that experimenter's observation distorts subjects' objectives by testing an ultimatum game. 5 Andreas Ortmann and Lisa Tichy (1999) try to deal with the experimenter bias problem by jointly conducting a test on gender differences in prisoner's dilemma. However, the physical testing three different treatments of the trust game. In the first two treatments there are a female and a male experimenter respectively, while in the third treatment we adopt a double blind procedure.
Our test follows nearly the same design as Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) , but we differentiate from them for two variants: first, we impose that each subject plays both roles of sender and of responder; secondly, when participants play as senders, they are informed about the gender of the responder with whom they are paired off. 6 This variation serves two purposes. First, it permits to test the relevance of gender pairing in bilateral relationships, which has been tested experimentally by Sutter, Bosman, Kocher and van Winden (2003) . They find that cooperation between players is lower when bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender.
Second, it aims at focusing subjects' attention on the gender variable. In this way, an explicit signal about the experimental purpose is conveyed to all subjects, each of whom acts both as sender and responder. If they conjecture that the experiment intends to study gender differences in trust and reciprocity, we expect their behaviour to be affected by experimenter's gender.
Specifically, our conjecture is that in the double blind treatment subjects exhibit behaviour significantly different from that in the other two treatments. In addition, we expect subjects to change their behaviour significantly in relation to the experimenter's gender. By recalling Orne's (1962) suggestion, we presume that subjects try to guess the experimental purpose. Our hypothesis is that the presence of the female experimenter, differently from that of the male experimenter, induces subjects to believe that the experimental purpose is in some way related to non-selfish behaviour. Thus, we conjecture that, being women perceived by the experiment subjects as more altruistic than men, the female experimenter induce an increase of the degree of altruism in all subjects. The subjects' attempt to conform to the supposed experimental should have two effects. First, that senders, who are informed of the paired responder's gender, presence of two experimenters, one male and one female, does not remove the possibility that one of the two experimenters is perceived by the participants as the leading one. For example, the person who reads the instructions aloud is usually considered to conduct the experiment. 6 We do not to inform responders about their sender's gender to differentiate factors influencing reciprocity and trust. As discussed below, if subjects, when they played as responders, did not know the gender of their paired sender, their decision to reciprocate could be considered dependent only on the amount of money received and on the experiment's perceived purpose.
should increase the degree of trust in women in the female treatment in comparison with the male treatment, because trust is mainly intended as an economic investment in the trustee's reliability. Secondly, that responders, who do not know the paired sender's gender, should reciprocate subjects of both genders more in the female than in the male treatment because reciprocity is mainly motivated by altruism.
Experimental procedures
The experiment was carried out in the spring of 2004. We submitted the trust game to 94 subjects: 46 women and 48 men. They were undergraduate students in economics from the University of Siena and in political sciences from the University of Florence, recruited from first year economics courses through billboards posted on the web pages and around the campuses of the two universities.
The experiment was run manually. The participants were paid according to the euros earned. There was no participation fee.
We ran three treatments. The only difference between the first and the second treatment was that a female and a male respectively played the role of experimenter. 7 It was made clear to subjects that in these treatments only the experimenter was able to attribute individual choices to individual people. However, anonymity between subjects was guaranteed. The third control treatment adopted a double blind procedure. Table 3 presents the number of participants for each session and treatment. In the female and male treatments, subjects were first identified by numbers.
These numbers were randomly assigned and determined the pairings of senders and responders. Then each subject was directed to an isolated desk to make his or her decision privately. There they received written instructions. The first part of the instructions was read aloud by the experimenter of the pertinent gender. The second part contained a short questionnaire that was answered at the end of the experiment.
When the experiment began, subjects were given a large unmarked envelope which contained the money to be invested (5 euros which could be transferred in steps of half units), a card marked with the identification number and a small envelope marked with a circle that was either pink or blue. Subjects were asked to remember their numbers. The correspondence between each number and each participant remained unknown to the other participants but not to the experimenter and this was made clear to the participants. Subjects were also informed that if the circle was pink (blue) the person to whom they were to send money was a female (male). In this way, the sender knew the responder's gender but the sender's gender remained unknown to the responder.
Senders decided how many euros to keep and how many euros they wish to send to their partner by inserting them in the small envelope. The experimenter collected the small envelopes, recorded privately the amount sent, tripled it and placed the tripled money into the same envelope for delivery to the appropriate responder. Responders then opened their envelopes and decided how much of the money received to return to the sender. The experimenter again collected the envelopes, recorded the amounts returned and gave the envelopes back to the senders. Subjects were informed in the written instructions that they would be playing both roles of sender and responder but also that the responder to whom they were paired as sender would not be their sender when they played the role of responder.
In the double blind treatment, the design had to guarantee to the participants that the experimenter was unable to attribute individual choices to individual subjects and to avoid any hint about the experimenter's gender. Subjects were gathered in a room where two undergraduate students, a male and a female previously instructed to play the role of monitors, gave them instructions to read privately. When the experiment began, subjects were given a large unmarked envelope, which contained 5 euros, a smaller envelope and a numbered identification card. The small envelope was marked with a 7 The authors served as experimenters for the two treatments. In each session, there was also an assistant of the same gender as the experimenter. pink or a blue circle. As in the previous treatments, subjects were informed that the coloured circle on the small envelope identified the gender of their paired responder.
Moreover, they were asked to remember their numbers. The correspondence between these numbers and identities of the subjects remained unknown to the experimenters, to the monitors and to the other participants at all times and this was made clear to the participants.
Once senders had decided how much money to send to their partners in the small envelopes, they had to insert the identification cards in the smaller envelopes.
Moreover, each subject had to write on the identification card the letter F, if female, or the letter M, if male. The sealed envelopes were collected in a closed urn and were taken by the monitor to the experimenters in another room. After recording the amount sent and tripling it, the experimenters marked each larger envelope with the number identifying a responder of the appropriate gender. The envelopes in the closed urn were delivered by the monitor to the subjects' room. At this time, subjects were called one at a time by the monitor.
Once called, a subject had to privately choose the envelope with her or his identification number from the urn placed on an isolated desk. Having decided how much of the money received to return to the sender, subjects sealed their envelopes. The monitors again collected the envelopes, and took them to the experimenters' room, where the experimenters recorded the amounts returned and gave the envelopes back for distribution to senders by the same procedure used before. When the experiment was over, all subjects left the room without revealing their identities.
To summarize, our variations with respect to the reference design by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) are the following ones:
1. All subjects played both roles (sender and responder) and they knew it before any decisions were made. 3. Only the third treatment was double blind, while in the first and in the second treatment, the experimenter (but not the subjects) was able to attribute individual choices to individual subjects and this was made clear to the subjects.
Results
Our experiment intends to verify the effect of experimenter bias by testing three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that subjects' behaviour in the double blind treatment is significantly different from that in the other two treatments, in which the experimenter is able to associate each participant to his or her choices. The other two conjectures are related to the experimenter's gender. The second hypothesis is that in the female treatment senders exhibit a higher level of trust in women than in the male treatment. The third hypothesis is in the female treatment responders exhibit a higher degree of reciprocity than in the male treatment.
The discussion of the experimental findings addresses first the question of whether men and women make different choices across the three treatments for trust, and then for reciprocity. Table 4 presents senders' behaviour in the three treatments across gender. Contrary to earlier experimental evidence (see Table 2 ), on average women show a higher degree of trust than men, but the difference between the two means (38.3 and 30.4) is not significantly different from zero. However, the order between genders is reversed in the double blind treatment, whose results conform to the previous experimental findings. The lack of anonymity seems to represent a "social cue" that influences differently men and women. Experimenter's observation increases women's and decrease men's propensity to trust.
By considering the difference among treatments, on average the value of trust is higher in the female treatment than in the male treatment (35.7 vs. 31.3). Both women and men trust more in the female treatment and the difference in the fraction of the amount sent between women and men is not significant using either a t-test (with a tvalue of 0.04 and a p-value of 0.97) or a Wilcoxon rank sum test (with a z-value of 911
and a p-value of 0.63).
In Figure 1 , data on trust are summarized with box plots. The plots report the median of the data distribution, and the interquartile range to measure the data dispersion. The dispersion of data, which is higher in the female experimenter treatment, explains why the mean differences are not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the figure shows that the difference between men's and women's median values is greater than the difference between the corresponding average values. In our design, senders are informed of their paired responder's gender to emphasize the effect of experimenter bias. Table 5 presents the average values of trust by responder's gender. In the aggregate, senders trust slightly more men (35 %) than women (33%), but the difference between the two average values is not significant and the medians are nearly identical (Figure 2 ). In the male and in the female experimenter treatments, senders exhibit a higher degree of trust in men than in women, while in the double blind treatment the reverse is true. It is also relevant that there is no gender pairing effect because the degree of trust is quite similar across pairs of the same gender and of opposite gender. The box plots depicted in Figure 2 show that the amount of money sent to both men and women is more dispersed in the female experimenter treatment than in the other two treatments. These findings partially support our conjectures on sender's behaviour. In conformity with our first hypothesis, trusting behaviour exhibits systematic difference between the double blind and the other two treatments. However, experimenter's presence influences differently men and women: it increases the degree of trust of women and decreased that of men. This result may be attributed to a presumed women's higher sensitivity to the changes in the laboratory environment. 9 (Croson and Gneezy 2004) We also find evidence of difference in trusting behaviour between the female and the male treatments. However, the presence of the female experimenter increases the degree of trust in both genders' subjects and not only in women as predicted by our second hypothesis, which is consequently rejected.
9 In a survey on gender differences in the laboratory, Croson and Gneezy argue that "this variance (gender difference) can be explained by a differential sensitivity of men and women to the social conditions in the experiment. Research from psychology suggests that women are more sensitive to social cues in determining appropriate behavior than are men. (…) Participants of both genders are likely maximizing an underlying utility function, but the function that men use is less sensitive to the conditions of the experiment, information about the other party, and (even) the other party's actions, than the function that women use." (Croson and Gneezy 2004, p. 19) Next, we turn to the analysis of responders' choices. Table 6 shows the degree of reciprocity that is measured by the average fractions returned by responders. The strongest pattern of behaviour is that the presence of the female experimenter induces subjects of both genders to reciprocate more than in the other treatments. This result is confirmed by Figure 3 , which presents the median values and the interquartile range of the distribution in the three treatments. 
Reciprocity
The median values in the male experimenter treatment and in the double blind treatment are quite similar and significantly lower than in the female experimenter treatment. Statistical tests also corroborate this difference for the average values. Table   7 shows that both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test are significant at 95%. The box plots in Figure 4 show how male responders particularly showed a lower degree of reciprocity in the male experimenter treatment. This effect is reinforced by the fact that the median value is zero. The propensity to be "fairer" in the female experimenter treatment is also confirmed by the statistical analysis of men's behavior. 11 Table 8 shows that the presence of a female experimenter induced male subjects to reciprocate significantly more than in the other two treatments, using either a t-test or a Wilcoxon rank sum test. These findings support our third hypothesis. In the female treatment, responders' behaviour exhibits a higher propensity to reciprocate. According to the proposed interpretation, experimenter bias is effective only for the treatment in which the signal used to infer the experimental purpose is perceived by subjects as more evident, namely, the presence of the female experimenter.
Conclusions
This paper has aimed at analysing the experimenter bias effect in a test on gender differences. We assume that experimental subjects seek to discover the true purpose of the experiment and may modify their spontaneous behaviour to confirm experimenter's expectations. The gender of the experimenter may produce this bias if gender differences are explicitly considered as treatment variables.
We tested the trust game by differentiating subjects' information: trusters were informed of their paired trustee's gender but trustees did not know their paired truster's gender. We observed behaviour in three different treatments: the female treatment and the male treatment, conducted respectively by a female and a male experimenter, and 11 The amount of money received from the paired sender and the percentage of money sent back to the paired sender was positively correlated with the Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.46 (0.576 for women and 0.372 for male), which was significant at the 0.01 level in all cases.
the double blind treatment, where complete anonymity among subjects and between subjects and experimenter was guaranteed.
Our findings show that:
there is significant evidence of difference in trusting behaviour between the double blind and the other two treatments;
(ii) the presence of the female experimenter increases the degree of trust in subjects of both genders (not only in women), although not in a statistically significant way;
(iii) the presence of the female experimenter significantly increases the propensity to reciprocate of male and female subjects.
We interpret these results as generally supportive of the relevance of experimenter bias. In our interpretation, experimenter bias is effective when subjects receive a signal clear enough to convey a specific experimental purpose. The presence of the female experimenter was perceived by the subjects as evidence that the experiment's purpose was to corroborate the hypothesis of other-regarding behaviour.
This conjecture increased subjects' propensity to be altruistic and consequently improved trust and reciprocity.
Finally, our experiment supports the hypothesis that women are perceived by others as potentially less selfish than men. If altruism is enhanced by the assessment of how altruistic others are in return, the gender variable can provide useful signal to implement altruistic behaviour.
Instructions for all participants

A. Female and Male Experimenter Treatments
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The Ministry of University and the University of Siena have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be given to you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you and answer your question.
In this experiment, each of you will be paired with a different person. You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment nor will they be told who the others are. The only information you will have is the gender of the person to which you are paired. The experimenter will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. In addition, he will verify that the instructions have been followed as they appear here.
Each person will be given 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment. Each person will have the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all or none of their show-up fee to the person which you are paired to. The amount sent will be tripled. For example, if you send an envelope that contains 2 euros, the envelope will contain 6 euros when it reaches the paired person. If you send an envelope that contains 4 euros, the envelope will contain 12 euros when it reaches the paired person. The paired person will then decide how much money to send back to you and how much money to keep.
Each person will play both roles in the experiment. Each of you will be paired with two people. In one pair, you will be the person who decides how many of the 5-euro show-up fee to send to another person, who receives the amount sent tripled by the experimenter. In the other pair, you will be the person who receives the amount sent by another person and tripled by the experimenter and you will decide to send back some, all, or none of the amount received to the sender. So each of you will take two decisions. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that you are not paired with the same person as sender and responder. Rather you are paired with two different people.
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how the experiment is run. This experiment is structured so that no one, except the experimenter, will know the personal decision of people. Since your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision during, or after, the experiment.
The experiment is conducted as follows: a number of large unmarked envelopes have been placed in a box. Each of these envelopes contains 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment, a card marked with an identification number that you are asked to remember, and a smaller envelope marked with a circle, which will be coloured pink or blue. The experimenter will hand one person at a time an unmarked envelope from the box. Once a person has an envelope, he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and place as many euros in the smaller circled envelope as they want, keeping the rest. Examples: (1) put 2 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 3 euros; (2) put 4 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 1 euro. These are examples only; the actual decision is up to each person.
It is important to keep in mind that the person who received the amount you sent will be a female if the smaller envelope is marked with a pink circle and he will be a male if the smaller envelope is marked with a blue circle. This process will continue until everyone has made his or her decision.
Once a person has made a decision, the experimenter will collect all the larger, unmarked envelopes, and return them to the box. Notice that each returned envelope will look exactly the same.
After all the envelopes have been put in the return box, the experimenter will then privately, one at a time, take the smaller envelopes out of the larger envelopes, record on a sheet of paper the number of the identification card and the amount of money inside the smaller envelope. The experimenter will then triple the amount of money in the smaller envelope and place the smaller envelope back into the larger envelope. At this point, the experimenter will transfer the envelopes in the return box.
The experimenter will then give to each person, one at a time, an unmarked envelope from the box. Each of you will privately open the larger envelope and must decide how many euros to leave in the smaller envelope. The person keeps the remaining euros. The smaller envelope should then be placed in the larger envelope. When everyone has had the opportunity to make his or her decision, the experimenter will collect the larger envelopes and return them to the box. The experimenter will then privately, one at a time, open the larger envelopes and record how much is in the smaller envelope. After recording how much was in the smaller envelope, the experimenter will put the smaller envelope in the larger envelope, and will place them back in the return box.
Then experimenter will choose one person at a time to go to the box marked return envelopes to retrieve the smaller envelope with the appropriate identification number marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until everyone has retrieved his or her envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, experimenter will ask if everyone has retrieved the correct envelope. If the people have all taken the correct envelope, then the experiment is finished. If, however, an envelope has ended up with the wrong person, then the experimenter will collect all the smaller envelopes again and the process will repeat until everyone has the correct envelope.
Before leaving the room you, everyone will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire. At the top of the questionnaire, you will be asked for the card identification number. Please do not forget to include this information. Once you have finished the questionnaire, you will be asked to put it in the box placed at the back of the room.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions regarding how the experiment will proceed.
B. Double Blind Treatment
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The Ministry of University and the University of Siena have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. Two of us have been chosen as monitors and will check that the instructions have been followed as they appear here. However, they will not answer any questions during this experiment. If you have any doubts, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk, at all, during this experiment. If you follow these instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be given to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, each of you will be paired with a different person. You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment nor will they be told who the others are. The only information you will have is the gender of the person to which you are paired.
Each person will play both roles in the experiment. Each of you will be paired with two people. In one pair, you will be the person who decides how much of the 5-euro show-up fee to send to another person, who receives the amount sent tripled by the monitors. In the other pair, you will be the person who receives the amount sent by another person and tripled by the experimenter and you will decide to send back some, all, or none of the amount received to the sender. So each of you will take two decisions. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that you are not paired with the same person as sender and responder. Rather you are paired with two different people.
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how the experiment is run. This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the monitors, will know the personal decision of people. Since your decision is absolutely private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision during, or after, the experiment.
The experiment is conducted as follows: a number of large unmarked envelopes have been placed in a box. Each of these envelopes contains 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment, a card marked with an identification number that you are asked to remember, and a smaller envelope marked with a circle, which will be coloured pink or blue. Then monitors will call one person at a time to go to the isolated box placed in the front of the room. Each person will take an unmarked envelope from the box and will come back to his or her isolated desk.
Once a person has an envelope, he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and wrote on the identification card the letter F if he is a female or the letter M if he is a male. Please do not forget to include this information. Then each person place as many euros in the smaller circled envelope as they want, keeping the rest. Examples: (1) put 2 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 3 euros; (2) put 4 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 1 euro. These are examples only; the actual decision is up to each person. It is important to keep in mind that the person who received the amount you sent will be a female if the smaller envelope is marked with a pink circle and a male if the smaller envelope is marked with a blue circle. This process will continue until everyone has made his or her decision.
Once a person has made a decision, he or she will put the smaller envelope and the identification card in the larger envelope. Then the monitors will call one person at a time to go to the isolated box. Each person will put the larger envelope into the box. Notice that each returned envelope will look exactly the same and neither monitors nor others will be able to attribute individual choices to individual subjects.
After all the envelopes have been put in the return box, the monitors will then privately, one at a time, take the smaller envelopes out of the larger envelopes, record on a sheet of paper the letter and the number written on the identification card and the amount of money inside the smaller envelope. The monitors will then triple the amount of money in the smaller envelope, place the smaller envelope back into the larger envelope, and write an identification number on the larger envelope. At this point, the monitors will transfer the envelopes in the return box.
The monitors will then call one person at a time to go to the isolated box to retrieve the larger envelope with his or her identification number marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until everyone has retrieved his or her appropriate envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, monitors will ask if everyone has retrieved the correct envelope. If the people have all taken the correct envelope, then the experiment will continue. If, however, an envelope has ended up with the wrong person, then the monitors will call one person at a time again and the process will repeat until everyone has the correct envelope.
Then each of you will privately open the larger envelope and must decide how many euros to leave in the smaller envelope. The person keeps the remaining euros. The smaller envelope should then be placed again in the larger envelope. When everyone has had the opportunity to make his or her decision, the monitors will call again one person at a time. Each person will return the larger envelopes to the box. The monitors will then privately, one at a time, open the larger envelopes and record how much is in the smaller envelope. After recording how much was in the smaller envelope, the monitors will put the smaller envelope in the larger envelope, and will place them back in the return box.
Then monitors will call one person at a time to go to the box marked return envelopes to retrieve the smaller envelope with the appropriate identification number marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until everyone has retrieved his or her envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, monitors will ask if everyone has retrieved the correct envelope. If the people have all taken the correct envelope, then the experiment is finished. If, however, an envelope has ended up with the wrong person, then the monitors will collect all the smaller envelopes again and the process will repeat until everyone has the correct envelope.
At this time, you should take all your belongings and leave the building when you are done. When everyone in the room has left, the experiment is over, and the monitors will be paid for their participation.
